| Hubris | Exchanging Patient Records: 2 |
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Permissions and Access ControlHow do we handle access control lists in a practical GP record system, and what effect does it have on disclosurs to lawyers, insurance companies and the Courts. For that matter, to the patients themselves? |
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Date: Tue, 5 Aug 1997. Adrian Midgley Suppose for a moment we have the medical record of the whole practice held as a single table, with each successive line in the table containing a field with the patient's unique identifier, then a field with an element of medical history (examination/results/hypothesis or conjecture/prescription or whatever), how do we handle the marking of this with permissions for people to view it? Seriously, I would like some references or even better a private if you like e-mail from those who know what has worked well thus far. As a first approximation, perhaps we add another field to each line which holds a reference to a line in a dictionary of permissions.
The dictionary of permissions is a table with an
arbitrarily large number of lines, and which can have more
lines added by any user. As each line is added to the history table, (semi-automatically) a set of permissions is selected from the dictionary and the reference added to the line of history.
What does this protect against, or rather, how far can we easily go in adding security of individual records to a patient's notes?One of the assumptions I am prepared to make is that on the whole we are protecting against fairly casual access to private matters, rather than defences against a determined attack on secrets.Another is that most of the people who have physical access to the machinery are willing to cooperate with the privacy restrictions - not that they are not nosy, rapid upside-down skim-readers, interested in trivia etc, but that they won't make a determined effort to defeat the precautions. The contrary one is that most of the people we are really trying to protect hard against are ones who are external to the Practice, and don't have easy, legitimate physical access to the equipment, so physical security is our main protection there. Encryption may not be necessary in an early version of this (and given it has to run on 386s this is just as well)
And what are the consequences given the things we do with the notes?Well - the first interesting one that jumps to mind is that whatever is marked as private against access by me simply doesn't exist as far as I can tell.Not secrets that I know but must not disclose except with informed consent, but simply non-existent. So when I run the notes to produce a personal medical adviser report for an insurance company, the privacy marked entries don't appear. And I don't know them so my answers are honest. How about if the notes are sub-poenaed? Same applies unless the patient's permissions are applied against the records (assuming nothing has been marked private from them) or unless Big Brother has persuaded us that BB is first on every line of the permissions dictionary.
It is OK as far as I am concerned, because the records are
the only records I possess.
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